A recent editorial in the New York Times suggests that if Russia gains anything in their Ukraine war, such as the Crimea, they will be emboldened to do more territorial grabs. I think this is too simplistic a reading. If Russia "wins," they will feel empowered. But what is "winning?"
Consider this outcome: Ukraine cedes the Donbas and Crimea to Russia in exchange for peace. That's a substantial gain for Russia, true... except that in fact, the Donbas and Crimea had already been in Russian control when the war started.
Stack up against that unimpressive gain all that Russia lost: Sweden and Finland joined NATO. Ukraine is on track to joining NATO as soon as the war is over. Indeed, the reason for NATO's existence--defense against foreign aggression--has gone from quaint Cold War relic to vibrant immediacy. Finland, in particular, would never have joined NATO, having for nearly a century charted its independent course of non-provocation against their massive neighbor. This is a huge loss.
Then there are the efforts of European countries to develop alternatives to Russian gas, the stalling of pipeline deals. Russia has wielded gas as a big stick against Europe, but I've always maintained that was a two-edged stick (so to speak). Russia needs the European market as much as Europe needs Russian gas. This is a loss that will be hard to repair.
The third loss to Russia is reputational. Going into the war, it was expected that the enormous Russian military would simply roll over Ukraine. Russia was the heir of one of the world's two Superpowers. All but invincible. Now they've been exposed as a second-rate, bloated, inefficient force. If they can't even succeed against Ukraine, let alone their technical and economic superiors in Europe, they don't need to be feared as they once were.
Balancing off the loss to reputation, economics, and diplomacy, all Russia has gained was... what they would have had if they hadn't started the war. Allowing Russia a nominal "win" may be the face-saving gesture necessary to get Putin to accept a defeat. Given the internal politics of Russia, Putin is likely to play every card he has rather than accept unconditional withdrawal. That means years of warfare and suffering in Ukraine, even if he does not deploy tactical nuclear weapons.
Consider Finland again. Just before WWII, the Soviet Union demanded that Finland turn over a bit of territory. Finland refused, believing that if they agreed, the Soviet Union would demand more and more. Stalin invaded, launching the Winter War, a debacle that ended in the Soviet Union winning exactly what they asked for. But the Finnish defense was so fierce, and so costly, that the Soviet Union did not attempt any further claims. Stalin's "victory" was marginal at best, Finland's "hopeless war" ultimately triumphant.
An end to the Ukraine war that offers Putin a graceful exit may be far preferable to one that "punishes him." He has already punished himself.
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UPDATE 2/2024: Sadly, this option is not as good as it once was. Russia has already achieved a victory Putin is pleased with. Thanks to partisan Republican gamesmanship, the mantle of US protection has suffered a grievous wound. Our allies cannot rely on our help. Even if we do eventually send Ukraine aid, the uncertainty has done its work. The possibility that an attack on NATO would draw a forceful US response is no longer assured. Putin will be pleased with this outcome, and is probably even now assessing how much he can harass Poland and Finland. Not only that, but China and Iran and North Korea have seen the same thing, and are wondering how much they might dare. I don't think one can overstate the damage congressional Republicans have done to international relations.
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